This paper uses a rich data set to explore the relationship between shelf prices and manufacturers' coupons for 25 ready-to-eat breakfast cereal brands in up to 65 cities over a four-year (sixteen quarter) period. Contrary to the predictions of static monopoly price discrimination, we find that shelf prices for a particular brand in a particular city are generally lower in quarters when coupons are available. We explore additional theories of couponing that might explain the negative correlation with shelf prices. By exploiting the three-dimensional panel nature of our data set, we control for exogenous city, brand and time effects and find that the negative correlation between prices and coupons generally persists. We also find evidence that is inconsistent with dynamic descriptions of demand that predict that lower prices could accompany coupons, and find little support for explanations that are based on the vertical relationship between manufacturers and retailers. We find some support for models of price discrimination in oligopoly settings that suggest inter-brand competition can cause all prices to be lower than the uniform (non-discriminatory) price.
INTRODUCTION
Manufacturers of consumer goods circulate coupons as parts of advertisements that appear in newspapers, magazines or direct mailings. If a customer clips a coupon, brings it to a store and buys the designated product, he or she is entitled to a discount. In 1996, consumer packaged goods manufacturers distributed 268.5 billion coupons, of which 5.3 billion (2 percent) were redeemed. The average face value for coupons issued in 1996 was 67 cents, so consumers redeemed coupons worth about $3.5 billion.
1 For some manufacturers, promotion budgets, mainly comprising coupon costs, are nearly as big as advertising budgets. This paper considers coupons for ready-to-eat (RTE) breakfast cereal, one of the most heavily couponed products.
Research on couponing spans several disciplines, including economics and marketing. In this paper, we will focus on the relationship between coupons and shelf prices. Existing work suggests a number of factors that may influence that relationship. Some researchers, primarily economists, have chosen to explore the potential price discriminatory effects of coupons. Price discrimination suggests that shelf prices will be positively correlated with coupons since only the less price sensitive consumers will continue to pay the shelf price. There are a number of theoretical models and empirical analyses of the price discriminatory aspects of coupons. The empirical work has uncovered patterns consistent with the price discrimination interpretation of coupons, showing for instance that coupon users have more elastic demand than non-users (see Narasimhan, 1984) . No papers (of which we are aware) look directly at the relationship between shelf prices and coupons. 2 Other researchers have addressed the promotional dimensions of couponing, and emphasize, for instance, the effects coupons have on the likelihood that a consumer will try a new product, or how coupons might shift the point in time when a consumer decides to purchase a product.
In this paper, we draw on a three-dimensional panel data set with information on shelf prices and available coupons for 25 RTE breakfast cereal products in up to 65 cities for every quarter from the beginning of 1989 until the end of 1992. We consider the correlation between shelf prices and the discount offered by valid coupons for a particular brand in a particular city during a given quarter. We observe some city-brand-quarters where there is no coupon and others when a coupon has recently been distributed, and we analyze shelf prices under the different coupon states. We exploit the panel nature of the data set to control for demand and cost factors that may affect sellers' decisions about coupons and prices simultaneously.
We find that shelf prices are generally lower when there is a coupon available, and this result holds as we add a number of fixed effects to control for unobserved changes in demand and costs. We then evaluate a number of possible explanations for the negative relationship between coupons and shelf prices. We find some support for models of price discrimination in oligopoly settings that suggest inter-brand competition can cause all prices to be lower than the uniform (non-discriminatory) price (Corts, 1998) . We find less support for theories that suggest the vertical relationship between manufacturers and retailers affects the correlation between shelf prices and coupons, and evidence that is inconsistent with dynamic descriptions of demand that predict that lower prices could accompany coupons. This paper also adds to the literature on the RTE breakfast cereal industry. The industry has attracted the attention of both academic economists and the antitrust authorities since it is a highly concentrated, stable oligopoly. A number of manufacturer decisions have been studied (for example, on product positioning see Schmalensee, 1978, and Scherer, 1979 ; on pricing see Nevo 1998), though our paper provides a unique analysis of manufacturers' short-run, non-price strategies. The time spanned by our data includes a rapid escalation in couponing, and preceded attempts by the manufacturers' to stop issuing coupons.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we review past work on coupons, organizing the summary into theories that predict that coupons and prices will be positively correlated and those that predict coupons and prices will be negatively correlated. In the third section we describe our data. Section four presents our empirical results on the relationship between shelf prices and coupons. Section five concludes.
POTENTIAL RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN COUPONS AND SHELF PRICES
There is a large body of research on coupon promotions with contributions from several different disciplinary traditions. In this section, we summarize a number of descriptions of coupons, focusing on implications the theories have for the relationship between coupons and shelf prices. We describe explanations that predict coupons and prices will be positively correlated (implying that prices will go up when coupons are available) and explanations that predict that coupons and prices will be negatively correlated. For each theory we also briefly outline how we plan to examine it. The theories we describe are not necessarily mutually exclusive, and our empirical work does not necessarily pit one model against another. Instead we want to describe the empirical importance of the various explanations.
Prices will Go Up When Coupons are Available

Price Discrimination
Couponing is a canonical example of price discrimination. 3 If only more price sensitive customers bother to clip, save and use coupons, coupons allow the manufacturers to separate customers into groups with distinct price elasticities. In order to separate consumers, a monopolist must be able to identify consumers by type and prevent consumers from reselling. To the extent people who cut and use coupons are more sensitive to prices, coupon use clearly allows a seller to identify customers with higher price elasticities. High transaction costs ensure that the second condition holds as well.
Under some very general conditions on demand, the theoretical effect of third-degree price discrimination on prices is unambiguous in the case of a monopolist. If a monopolist can separate its customers into two groups, it will charge the group with less elastic demand a higher price than the group with the more elastic demand. The less elastic group's price will also be (weakly) higher than the uniform price (see Varian, 1989 for an overview).
4
A number of empirical studies have found indirect evidence that coupons allow sellers to price discriminate. Studies have demonstrated that coupon users have higher price elasticities of demand (Narasimhan, 1984) and that low-priced generic products have lower market shares if the brand-name manufacturers coupon heavily (Sethuraman and Mittelstaedt, 1992) . Gerstner, Hess and Holthauser (1994) present a model that demonstrates that manufacturers will find it less profitable to use coupons for goods which retailers markup significantly and test it by relating the number of coupons issued by broad product category to retailers average margins by product category. No existing studies (of which we are aware) have considered directly the relationship between shelf prices and coupons. 5 The data set we use in this paper permits us to look for direct evidence that manufacturers increase the price to customers who do not use coupons when they issue coupons.
Empirical attempts to identify instances of price discrimination have faced several challenges, which we are able to circumvent due to the nature of our problem. First, many cases in which it appears a seller is charging two prices for the same good are in fact driven by differences in the costs of selling to different groups of people. For instance, senior citizen discounts at movie theaters, sometimes cited as examples of price discrimination, may in fact be a form of peak-load pricing reflecting the fact that seniors tend to attend movies during less popular times (see Lott and Roberts, 1991) . In the case of coupons, the cost of the good supplied to coupon users and non-users is clearly identical, and, if anything, the supplier incurs additional costs to circulate and process the coupons.
The second challenge is to control for demand and cost conditions that affect both couponing and shelf prices. For instance, we find that coupons are more frequently disseminated in large cities and that shelf prices are also higher in the large cities.
6 Simply looking at cross-city differences, therefore, would suggest shelf prices and coupon availability are positively correlated. It is plausible, however, that delivery or retailer costs are higher in large cities while the cost of distributing coupons is lower (for instance, if there is a fixed cost that gets spread over more people). Existing empirical studies of price discrimination with coupons have generally relied on broad cross-sectional comparisons and have done little to account for other possible explanations of observed patterns. 
Correlation between Coupons and Advertising Campaigns
Coupons and shelf prices may appear positively correlated if coupons are correlated with factors that shift demand for a product at all prices. Most of the marketing articles consider the demand effects of coupons assessing the types of customers that use coupons and how they affect consumers' purchase decisions. 8 We already noted several articles above that considered evidence for price discrimination by comparing the price sensitivity of coupon users and nonusers. Other articles have tried to assess the effects coupons have on demand for a product by considering additional characteristics of coupon users (e.g. assessing whether they were new buyers or had previously purchased the product) or by trying to assess what coupon users would have done in the absence of an available coupon. Though the literature tends not to speak directly to the relationship between coupons and shelf prices, the results suggest certain patterns. For instance, we may observe a positive correlation empirically if coupons shift demand out. Increases in demand will lead to higher prices if the suppliers face upward sloping cost functions or if demand becomes less elastic and suppliers raise markups.
Marketing articles have used a variety of techniques to assess whether coupons expand demand for a product (that is, generate incremental sales). For example, Neslin (1990) examines coupons for seven instant coffee brands over a one-year period in one (unnamed) city. He finds a positive correlation between coupon availability and a brand's market share and concludes that on average 44 percent of coupon users would not have purchased the brand in absence of a coupon. Chiang (1995) , however, explicitly models individual consumers' decisions to use a coupon (to account for selection) and finds that coupons do not expand demand for a particular category of products, though he does not consider intra-category, inter-brand effects.
Other research has focused on whether characteristics of the coupon itself or the distribution vehicle affect whether the coupon lures new or infrequent users (i.e., expands demand). Neslin and Clarke (1987) experimentally distributed coupons and then surveyed recipients on the frequency with which they purchased the product in the past and whether or not they used the coupon to purchase the good after they received it. They find, for instance, that when the survey respondents had to voluntarily request coupon booklets, they were more likely to use the coupons to try new brands. Similarly, Lee and Brown (1985) show that a particular type of coupon increased demand for non-coupon users while others only affected users' demand (see also, Srinivasan, Leone and Mulhern, 1995) . Other studies have assessed whether characteristics of the advertisements accompanying the coupon in the free-standing insert (FSI) change redemption patterns (LeClerc and Little, 1997) .
If coupons are used to price discriminate, one still might observe coupons generating incremental sales since price discrimination allows the supplier to price below the valuation of a larger number of customers. Other explanations suggest that coupons could shift demand by either alerting customers to the existence of a new good or reminding them of the attributes of an old one. Without surveying customers about their motivation for using the coupon, it is very difficult to distinguish between the two effects. (One could imagine trying to take advantage of the fact that the price discrimination theory suggests a relationship between shelf prices and the face value of the coupon while shifts in demand are likely to be independent of face value, though it still may be difficult to disentangle the effects.) For our purposes, we simply want to note that coupons may shift demand, so even if manufacturers don't use them to price discriminate, shelf prices may go up when coupons are available.
Prices will Go Down When Coupons are Available
Price Discrimination with Strategic Interaction Effects
Recent work has extended the theory on price discrimination to oligopolistic industries. (see Borenstein, 1985; Holmes 1989; and Corts, 1998) Holmes (1989) shows that, under certain symmetry assumptions, the unambiguous prediction that discrimination will lead to higher profits extends to an oligopoly setting. Corts (1998) , however, points out that Holmes' symmetry assumptions are not innocuous. He derives conditions under which price discrimination may lead to lower profits, and, more importantly for our purposes, to lower prices for all consumers.
Corts' logic is best demonstrated through a simple example.
9 Suppose there are two types of cereal buyers, students and professors, and two types of cereal, Kellogg's Raisin Bran and General Mills Cheerios. Students choose cereals solely on price, while professors choose based on price and taste (and happen to think Raisin Bran tastes better). Assume that both cereals are manufactured at zero marginal cost. Also suppose that students cut coupons more than professors do. Without coupons (i.e. if the sellers are constrained to charge uniform prices), there is a plausible set of assumptions under which prices for the two cereals will be roughly equal. Cheerios would be shading down its optimal price to students and shading up its optimal price to professors, and Raisin Bran would be doing the opposite.
Ignoring strategic responses to the other firm's prices for a minute, it is clear that Cheerios has no incentive to offer coupons, but Raisin Bran can profitably use coupons to try to set a lower price for students. If Raisin Bran issues a coupon, however, there is a strategic effect on Cheerios prices. Since prices are strategic complements, after Raisin Bran puts out a coupon for students, Cheerios wants to lower its price to them and so issues a coupon. Since Cheerios and Raisin Bran are undifferentiated in students' eyes, the manufacturers will compete prices down to marginal cost (zero here). Once it has something that can separate professors and students, Cheerios will lower its shelf price to try to overcome professors' taste preference for Raisin Bran. Raisin Bran may in turn have a strategic response to Cheerios lower shelf price. In the end, both Raisin Bran and Cheerios shelf prices may be lower with coupons.
There are several assumptions that this example embodies, but only one that is central to Corts' result. Prices will only fall for all consumers if the coupon users and non-users have different brand preferences. (In the example, professors preferred Raisin Bran and students preferred Cheerios.) Corts labels this condition "best-response asymmetry." Empirically, we can assess the influence of strategic interaction effects by considering whether the relationship between a given brand's price and the coupons for that brand are influenced by the presence of coupons for competing brands.
Demand Effects
Prices and coupons may be negatively correlated if the manufacturers' decision to issue a coupon is correlated with factors that change demand in a market. For instance, Sobel (1984) develops a model in which suppliers periodically discount goods to clear the market of low valuation consumers. The model he develops assumes two types of consumers -high valuation and low valuation. Sobel also assumes that consumers arrive in the market over time and that low valuation consumers are willing to postpone their purchases. He demonstrates that sellers will periodically find it optimal to lower prices to clear out low valuation consumers. An extension of his model might suggest that sellers periodically use coupons to clear out low valuation consumers and leave shelf prices unchanged at the high consumers' valuation.
10 (Sellers may only 10 Various marketing studies lend some support to the hypothesis that coupons are used to target consumers that are willing to substitute demand intertemporally. Nesline, Henderson and Quelch (1985) find that coupons encourage people to accelerate their purchases and Eppen and Lieberman (1984) These models predict that coupons are issued in response to intertemporal patterns in demand -in this case the accumulation of low valuation consumers. Such changes in demand are difficult to measure empirically, though we attempt to corroborate these stories in several ways. For one, these stories predict distinct patterns in the relationship between the volume of cereal sold and coupons. Coupons would tend to be associated with high volume and may follow periods of low volume sales. Coupons are also unlikely to be issued in back-to-back periods.
There are also suggestions in the marketing literature that coupons affect the point at which people make a decision to buy a product. For instance, a consumer who sees a coupon in the Sunday paper may put the product on her shopping list and then be convinced to buy the product when she sees the product on sale at the store. Sellers may be willing to temporarily lower prices to lure new buyers if the new buyers, having tried the product, are willing to purchase the product in the future at the full price. (Levedahl, 1986 presents a model of coupons with dynamic effects on demand.) While these ideas often are difficult to reconcile with economists' notions of well-defined preferences, they suggest a negative correlation between prices and coupons.
Retailers' Objective Functions
To this point, we have abstracted from the fact that most goods for which coupons are issued are sold to the final consumers by a retailer and not by the manufacturer. (This is clearly the case for breakfast cereals). While the manufacturers issue coupons and set wholesale prices, retailers set the shelf prices. If coupons are simply price discriminatory mechanisms, it is relatively straightforward to show that the shelf price will increase (in the absence of the strategic effects discussed above). Even if the retail sector is perfectly competitive, manufacturers will increase the wholesale price. If retailers have some market power, they will increase the price further. Since all supermarkets provide baskets of goods, however, it is possible that the supermarkets take advantage of the advertising effects of coupons. If the coupons inspire customers to put a good on their shopping lists, supermarkets may then discount the couponed good (and advertise the discount) to lure people into their store, anticipating that they will also purchase high margin products. This might be the effect of coupons for cereal in particular since they are a staple good that a large fraction of consumers are likely to buy on a trip to a grocery store. Empirically we examine this hypothesis by correlating the patterns of coupons with structure of the retail sector in different cities
DATA
We explore the empirical relationship between coupons and shelf prices using data from two main sources. The cereal price data were obtained from the IRI Infoscan Data Base at the University of Connecticut.
11 These data were collected by Information Resources, Inc. (IRI), a marketing firm in Chicago, using scanning devices in a national random sample of supermarkets in metropolitan areas and rural towns. Weekly data for UPC-coded products are drawn from a sample, which represents the universe of supermarkets with annual sales of more than $2 million dollars, accounting for 82% of grocery sales in the US. In most cities the sample covers more than 20% of the relevant population, and due to the importance of the sample to its customers, IRI makes an effort to make the sample representative. This is confirmed by unpublished analysis conducted by the BLS.
In the Infoscan Data Base the data are aggregated by brand (for example different size boxes are considered one brand), city 12 and quarter. The data covers up to 65 different cities (the exact number increases over time), and ranges from the first quarter of 1989 to the last quarter of 1992. The price variable was created by dividing the dollar sales by the number of pounds sold. Dollar sales reflect the price paid by consumers at the cashier excluding discounts to manufacturer coupons. Therefore, the resulting variable is the city-brand-quarter average pre-coupon transaction price per pound.
The coupon data were obtained from Promotion Information Management (PIM), a research company that tracks coupons and other promotional strategies. (For example, General Mills might hire PIM to keep track of Kellogg's couponing and vice-versa.) PIM collects data on coupons issued in 69 major metropolitan areas, including all 65 of the IRI areas. 13 For each region, PIM obtains information on coupon inserts in the local newspapers (FSIs), on coupons run in the newspapers themselves (run-of-press) and on coupons in magazines. PIM also hires local residents to attempt to get on mailing lists to receive direct mailings, often containing coupons. Where they overlap, the PIM regions are closely aligned with IRI's geographic markets. Since most coupons are issued through inserts in newspapers, however, PIM's markets are defined by the circulation of the local newspaper and not strictly by the counties covered, as are IRI's markets. As a result, we may have some measurement error, to the extent people in, for instance, Hartford, Connecticut buy the Boston Globe instead of the Hartford Courant. We believe, however, that these measurement problems are limited.
We obtained information from PIM on coupons issued for every brand produced by the top five cereal manufacturers from 1989 through 1992.
14 The information consisted of the face value of the coupon, the cities where it was distributed, the distributor, date on which it appeared and its expiration date. The description of the coupons also characterizes the requirements that must be met for the customer to redeem the coupon, indicating, for instance, if the customer needed to buy two boxes of cereal to get a discount, or send in proofs-of-purchase labels to get a rebate. (The Appendix contains a more detailed description of the PIM data.)
We matched the price and coupon data by city, brand and quarter. If a coupon spanned more than one quarter (for instance, if it was distributed in mid-February but did not expire until the end of December) we assigned the coupon to the quarter in which it was first issued. Previous research has found that about 60 percent of coupons are used in the first two months after they are issued (Bowman, 1980) . Altogether, we have 23,350 observations reflecting information on 25 brands of cereal over sixteen quarters from 51 to 65 cities. (Over the time period we are considering, IRI's coverage expanded, so that at the beginning of the sample, we only have information for 51 cities and by 1992, we have information from 65.)
EMPIRICAL ESTIMATES OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PRICES AND COUPONS
Correlation Between Prices and Coupons
Empirically, we model the relationship between prices and coupons with the following equation:
Eq. 1
where SHELF PRICE bct is the average shelf price for cereal brand b in city c during quarter t and DOLLARS OFF bct is the value of the coupon available for cereal brand b in city c during quarter t.
15 DOLLARS OFF bct takes on a value of zero when there is no coupon available. We also estimate versions of equation 1 which include COUPON DUMMY bct , which equals one when there is a coupon available and zero when there is not, instead of DOLLARS OFF bct . γ b and φ c capture brand-and city-specific factors that affect demand or the cost of selling cereal. δ t is included to capture the trend in cereal prices over the time period we consider. We also present estimates which allow the brand-fixed effects to vary by city (we estimate γ bc ), the city-fixed effects to vary over time (we estimate φ ct ) and the time effects to vary by brand (we estimate δ bc ) Table 1 summarizes the variables we analyze. The average shelf price in our sample is about three dollars per pound. The bulk of the variation in shelf prices is across brands. The average face value of the coupon is about 50 cents and they are available in 85 percent of the observations we consider, though as we discuss in the Appendix, we suspect that the mean of this variable is high.
16 17 The average face value of available coupons (i.e. the conditional mean) is about 55 cents. We note the difference between the breakdown in the variation of shelf prices and dollars off. While the variation in prices is largely explained by brand, city and quarter dummy variables, this is not the case with coupons. We shall return to this point below when we discuss the explanatory power of our results.
Before we present the results, it is useful to consider how our empirical specification identifies the relationship between prices and coupons. Ideally, we would like to have exogenous, or randomly assigned, variation in the distribution of coupons. If that were the case, we could identify the causal effect of couponing by comparing, for example, the price of a brand in a certain city where a coupon was issued to the price of the same brand in other similar cities where no coupons were issued. Unfortunately, it is very unlikely that coupons were issued (or "dropped") at random. Alternatively, we could assume that coupons were issued at random conditional on observable variables. For example, one could assume that for a given brand in a particular city the exact timing of the coupon is random. Using the richness of our data we are able to explore a variety of such assumptions. Table 2 presents a number of estimates of Equation 1. Each column reports coefficients from separate specifications that use either DOLLARS OFF or COUPON DUMMY as the independent variable. Both specifications in a column include the same fixed effects. Moving across the columns, the specifications include increasingly more fixed-effects -the specifications in column I do not include any fixed effects while the specifications in column VIII include citybrand effects (γ bc ), city-time effects (φ ct ) and time-brand effects (δ bc ). Taken together, the results provide a description of the relationship between coupons and prices within and between cities, brands and quarters.
The specification in column I provides an estimate of the average effect of coupons on prices assuming that the couponing decision is determined at random. For obvious reasons, that is probably not a reasonable assumption. Columns II through VIII add more fixed effects to the model, and by doing so change the nature of the experiment. For example, adding quarter fixed effects controls for an increase in the tendency to issue coupons but still assumes that in a given quarter the coupons are issued at random across cities and brands. Adding city fixed effects (column III) allows for a correlation within a city, but assumes that this correlation is fixed across brands.
Except for the coefficient on COUPON DUMMY in columns I through III, the results through column VII suggest that shelf prices are negatively correlated with coupons. 18 The negative relationship between prices and COUPON DUMMY is statistically insignificant in Columns VI and VII. Column VIII uses the most flexible definition of fixed effects allowable in our data set, and the results in that column suggest essentially no relationship between prices and coupons. 93 percent of the variance in the dependent variable, however, is explained simply by including the brand, city and quarter dummy variables and 98 percent is explained by the time we add all the fixed effects (there are nearly 25*65 + 25*16 + 65*16 = 3065 estimated in total) in Column VIII.
Comparing the results across columns provides evidence on the relationship between prices and coupons across cities, brands, and quarters. Prices and couponing (captured by both the number of coupons dropped, COUPON DUMMY, and discounts offered through coupons, DOLLARS OFF) were both increasing over the time period covered by our data set, so not surprisingly, controlling for quarter fixed effects in Column II dampens the positive relationship between the two variables. Coupons and prices are positively correlated across cities implying that there is more couponing in more expensive cities. (Between estimates yield a coefficient of .33 on COUPON DUMMY, but the relationship is also discernible from the difference between columns II and III). Prices and coupon values are negatively correlated across brands, implying that higher valued coupons are issued for less expensive brands. The effect is the opposite for COUPON DUMMY, and fewer coupons are issued for the less expensive brands. (Neither of these effects is terribly strong in the between estimates.) Slightly different patterns emerge when we estimate more flexible fixed effects. Generally, the between city-brand effects are negative for DOLLARS OFF and positive for COUPON DUMMY (column II vs. column V). This suggests that there are higher valued coupons for cereals that are priced below the city average cereal price, but fewer of them. The between brand-time effects are positive, suggesting that there are more coupons for brands that sell for more of a premium in a particular quarter than the simple average quarter price suggests. The between city-time effects are positive, suggesting that there are more coupons in cities with more inflation.
If the fixed effects that we add in the later columns of Table 2 are correlated with the independent variables (either DOLLARS OFF or COUPON DUMMY), the results in the earlier column that did not include these fixed effects are suspect. We can obtain a measure of the bias reflected in the coefficients reported in the early columns of Table 2 by comparing the fixed-effect results to random-effects specifications. A random-effects specification assumes that the excluded effects are uncorrelated with the independent variables so that a regression without these effects will yield consistent but inefficient estimates, as will a fixed-effects estimator. If, on the other hand, the excluded effects are correlated with the couponing measure than a random-effects estimator will be biased. This has been widely used to construct a Hausman test for the null that the effects are not systematically correlated with the independent variables (Hausman, 1978) .
We performed Hausman tests on six sets of fixed effects: city, date, brand, city-brand, city-time and brand-time. In all cases save one, the data does not reject the equality of the random effects and fixed effects estimators, suggesting that the changes in the estimated values of the coefficients between the different columns of Table 2 are not due to correlation between unobserved effects and the couponing measure. The one case where the Hausman test rejected the null was for city-brand effects. This suggests that only those columns in Table 2 that include the interacted city-brand dummies are unbiased. The Hausman tests also provide us with some guidance in interpreting the additional explanations for coupons, suggesting that explanations that predict systematic differences in couponing practices for brands by city are more valid than explanations, that, for instance, predict systematic differences for brand over time. For instance, if coupons are being used to stave off generic competition, we might expect them to be correlated with brand-specific price increases over time. That is not the case. Instead, if coupons are issued as a strategic response to a competitor's coupon strategy in a particular city, we would expect them to be correlated with city-brand effects.
In general, the effect suggested by the results is small. The largest coefficient on DOLLARS OFF (column III) suggests that the shelf price decreases by ten cents when a coupon for 55 cents (the average coupon size in our data) is introduced. However, it is likely that due to the aggregation of the date the independent variable is measured with some error and therefore the coefficients are biased downward. It is well known that this bias is augmented by the use of within estimators. Following Griliches and Hausman (1986) we are able to use the panel structure of our data to both test for measurement error and also correct the bias. For example, firstdifference estimation of the coefficient in column V of Table 2 yields a coefficient of -0.02, while a 8 quarter difference estimator yields a coefficient of -0.09. This pattern is consistent with the existence of measurement error. Using a partial implementation of the Griliches-Hausman method to correct for this bias we obtain a coefficient of -0.22. We conclude that the effects are not as small as they might seem.
Taken together, the results in Table 2 suggest that coupons do not have a positive effect on prices, at least for the brands, years and cities our data cover. If one is willing to accept that the fixed effects control for all potential endogenity problems, then these results suggest that manufacturers do not view coupons primarily as price discriminatory mechanisms, at least as predicted by static models of monopoly price discrimination. However, it is possible that even in the most unrestricted case there is still some potential systematic component in the error term that is correlated with the couponing decision. Given the extremely high R 2 that seems unlikely, though it is still a possibility. It might be the case that the direct effect of coupons is to increase shelf prices, but there is something else that we are not capturing that is correlated with both coupons and prices. Even if the results presented in Table 2 do not fully rule out this possibility they strongly suggest that coupons are not merely a tool that allow firms to price discriminate.
Rather there are additional factors that are jointly influencing pricing and couponing decisions, and the effects of these factors seem to dominate the effects of price discrimination.
In order to shed light on some of the possible factors influencing couponing and pricing, the remainder of this section documents a number of patterns across brands, across cities and over time, the very effects Table 2 controls for. While we attempt to organize the discussion of the facts around certain possible explanations for the results in Table 2 , we also simply intend to document the trends and leave (formulation and) testing of specific hypotheses for future research. Table 3 describes coupon issues by type of cereal and by manufacturer.
Cross-Brand Effects
19 Across manufacturers, there seems to be a clear relationship between size and couponing, as the manufacturers are arranged from left to right in order of their market share within the industry, and the number of coupons per brand decreases monotonically across the bottom row of Table 3 . The manufacturer effects primarily drive differences by type of cereal, although all manufacturers coupon less heavily for kids' cereals (e.g. Corn Pops, Kix and Lucky Charms). Table 4 describes the patterns in coupon issues over time, documenting a significant increase in the number of coupons issued over the time period we consider. There were about 30 percent more coupons issued in 1991 and 1992 compared to the previous two years. Surveys of coupon practices across all consumer goods manufacturers also document increases in between 1989 and 1992, though not quite as dramatic as for cereals. In three of the four years, the heaviest couponing took place in the fourth quarter (October through December), though this could primarily reflect the fact that couponing was increasing over the three-year period.
One possible explanation for the negative relationship between coupons and prices is that the manufacturers facing particularly intense competition from generic manufacturers are both couponing heavily and reducing prices. 20 To evaluate that hypothesis, we obtained additional data on sales of generic products (see Wongtrakool, 1994) . For instance, we have information on the market shares of the ten leading generic brands in 1991 and 1992. Two of these generic products compete directly with cereals that are not in our sample (apple cinnamon toasted oats and bran flakes), but the rest provide competition for nine of the brands in our sample. 21 While brands with heavy generic competition tended to coupon more, brands that do not face heavy generic competition showed higher increases in the number of coupons dropped over the time period we consider. Also, couponing practices within the brands facing strong generic competition was negatively correlated with increases in generic sales.
It is also possible that the promotion activities of other branded manufacturers' influence the competitive environment within which couponing decisions are made. As discussed in Section 2, price discrimination in an oligopoly setting can, under certain assumptions, cause all prices to fall. Essentially, if prices are strategic complements and consumers have heterogeneous preferences over cereals, a rival's coupon may cause a seller to issue a coupon and lower its shelf price. To evaluate that description of our data, we estimated specifications similar to those reported in Table 2 , and included an interaction between COUPON DUMMY and a variable indicating whether or not competitors had valid coupons for "similar" products. 22 The results are reported in Table 5 .
The results are sensitive to the presence of fixed-effects, and more so than the results in Table 2 . The interaction term is positive until we introduce brand effects, and then it is negative and significant in specifications IV through VII. 23 The negative coefficient on the interaction term supports the hypothesis that coupons are more likely to accompany price reductions when they are contemporaneous with a competitors' coupon.
24 It is also interesting to note that the coefficient on COMPETITORS COUPON becomes positive. This suggests that coupons introduced independently of competitors' have the effect on prices predicted by theories of monopoly price discrimination. The confounding effects of monopolistic and oligopolistic price discrimination may explain the results in Table 2 .
While the interpretation we offer in the previous paragraph is intriguing, we offer it with some trepidation. First, the product categories are admittedly ad hoc, and the coefficients on the interaction terms are sensitive to the presence of fixed effects. Second, it is possible that the coefficient on the interaction term is picking up an omitted variable that influences all manufacturers' decisions to coupon. Such an effect is harder to reconcile with the results that include extensive fixed effects, so we have more confidence in the results at the bottom of Table  5 . 22 "Similar" products are defined as cereals classified in the same row of Table 3 . COMPETITORS' COUPON is equal to the percent of competing manufacturer's who had a coupon available in the same product category during the same quarter in the same city. The mean of the variable across all observations is .85. The mean of the interaction between COMPETITORS' COUPON and COUPON DUMMY is .73. 23 The importance of the brand effects suggests that the manufacturers are offering competing coupons more often for more expensive brands. 24 We estimated specifications similar to those reported in Table 5 using different product categories. While the results were not identical (for instance, the negative coefficient in column IV was not particularly robust), the general patterns were similar. Generally, there seem to be important positive correlation across brand*city and brand*quarter pairs between prices and the extent of overlapping couponing. Until we include those fixed effects, the coefficient on the interaction term is positive.
Cross-City Effects
Coupons and prices are positively correlated across cities. While a number of exogenous factors that vary across cities (for instance, population density and per capita income) may explain that result, several factors that vary across cities also plausibly can give us some insight into our results relating coupons to prices. We next attempt to dissect some of the cross-city effects in our data. Table 6 documents coupon issues in several cities, and demonstrates considerable heterogeneity in couponing across cities. The first column lists the total number of coupons issued in a particular city over the time period we study. The middle column lists the average discount offered per coupon in dollars. The last column lists the sum of the discounts offered divided by the total number of quarters for which we have data on each of the cities. This number represents the total savings an average consumer in a particular city could have achieved per quarter had they used every coupon issued. The differences are considerable, and residents in Dallas were exposed to nearly 40 percent more coupons than residents of Little Rock. The low number of coupons for Boston is somewhat misleading because Boston received more coupons with restrictions than unrestricted coupons. We suspect that some of the differences in the average discount may be driven by the retailers' offers to double coupons.
Dynamic Effects
We next investigate the dynamic effects of couponing. We examine two separate, but related, questions. First, we consider whether a decision to coupon is a function of previous quantities sold. Next, we look at the relationship between quantity sold and previous coupons offered. Since our goal is primarily to describe the dynamic relations between the endogenous variables we employ a panel vector auto-regressive (VAR) model and try to impose as little structure on the data as possible.
Let the dynamic relations between discounts offered by a coupon, shelf price and quantities sold, be described by the (structural) VAR model 
Note that in the reduced form the contemporaneous effects of the endogenous variables are absorbed in the variance matrix of the errors.
Without the city-brand specific effects equation 3 can be estimated using OLS. Once the equation includes city-brand effects OLS no longer yields consistent estimates. Furthermore, it is well known that simply adding city-brand specific dummy variables to the estimated equations will not solve the problem (for a discussion see Chamberlain, 1983 ). Below we follow Holtz-Eakin, Newey and Rosen (1988) by first differencing the data and using past levels of the variables as instrumental variables.
The results are presented in Table 7 . The first three columns in the table present the results for each of the endogenous variables, allowing for four lags in each of the variables, citybrand effects and quarterly dummy variables. The coefficients were estimated by first differencing the data and then using lagged values as instrumental variables. The last three columns present the results for the same three equations without allowing for the city-brand effects, and therefore are estimated using OLS.
The results in the column I through III of Table 7 suggest that coupons and prices Granger-cause volume but not vice versa. Prices and coupons, on the other hand, seem to impact each other with some lag. An interesting relation is suggested by the coefficients in column III. All lags of both the COUPON DUMMY and SHELF PRICE are correlated with current volume. However, the effect of price is decreasing over time, so longer lags are of smaller economic significance, while for coupons the effect is roughly constant. The signs of the coefficients suggest that the effect of a price decrease, embodied in a coupon, has an opposite effect than a reduction in the shelf price. Everything else constant, lower past shelf prices imply higher current demand, a result that is generally consistent with the Sobel (1984) theory of timing of sales. The effect of a discount offered by a higher past coupon are the opposite, which supports the general theme of our results -coupons are not merely price cuts.
Before we discuss how these results shed light on the dynamic theories discussed in Section 2, we note a few more results. First, the OLS regression presented in column IV has a low R-squared compared to the values in columns V and VI. This is typical of our results: a smaller proportion of the variance in the coupon variable is explained by the model. Second, all of the qualitative results discussed here stay the same if we replace the COUPON DUMMY variable with DOLLARS OFF.
In order to discuss the economic interpretation of the results we examine the MA(4) representation of the VAR model which is given by . ... ε affect the evolution of the endogenous variables in system described by equation 3. The matrices l Ψ can easily be computed recursively from the estimates of the reduced-form VAR (see Hamilton, 1994) .
The impulse response function based on equation 4 ignores the correlation between the shocks in the various equations, since it measures the effect of one shock holding everything else fixed. We recall that the correlation in these errors was introduced when we switched from the structural VAR model, given in equation 2, to the reduced-form VAR, given by equation 3. Therefore, a different question is to ask what is the effect of a shock to the (orthogonal) structural error on the endogenous variables? In order to answer this question we need to recover the structural parameters, in particular the contemporaneous effects captured by 0 B . Without additional assumptions these effects cannot be identified. We explored several sets of assumptions 25 and use them to construct orthogonal impulse response functions. Since the variance matrix of the residuals, presented in the bottom of Table 7 , is nearly diagonal the results were nearly identical to those presented below and therefore are not discussed here. In all cases the structural parameter on COUPON DUMMY in the pricing equation was nearly identical to those presented in Table 2 . Figure 1 displays various impulse response functions. Each graph displays the effects of a one standard deviation positive shock to the various error terms on the three different variables.
The results in Table 7 clearly suggest that manufacturers' decisions to coupon are not a function of previous quantities sold. Lagged values of quantity do not increase either the likelihood of introducing a coupon or the face value of the coupon. Section 2 also discussed two theories of the dynamic effects on demand. The first was in the spirit of Sobel (1984) . This theory suggests a path-dependence in the impact of price cuts. Everything else equal, fewer price cuts (whether in the form of lower prices or in the form of discounts) in the past lead to higher current demand. The impact of lagged prices on volume is consist with this theory -all else equal, lower lagged prices decrease current demand. Also the negative correlation in the coupon variable is consistent with this theory. However, this theory is not consistent with the estimated 25 The first assumption we used was to restrict the VAR model given in equation 2 to be recursive, which implies that the matrix 0 B is lower triangular and therefore uniquely determined by the Cholesky decomposition of the variance matrix of the residuals. We ordered the variables so that DOLLARS OFF at time t is not impacted by the value of either SHELF PRICE or VOLUME at time t, SHELF PRICE is only a function of DOLLARS OFF, while VOLUME is a function of both the other variables. We also explored sign restrictions on the various coefficients. These assumptions were not sufficient to identify the parameters, however, they allowed us to bound the admissible parameter space. The bounds were tight. effects of lagged coupons on volume. This does seem to suggest that this theory of the dynamic effects of coupons is not consistent with the data.
The final dynamic effect discussed in Section 2 was an advertising effect. Coupons may induce consumers to try new brands, making them more likely to purchase the product in the future. Both the facts that coupons have a different impact than price cuts, and that their impact is somewhat long lasting are consistent with this theory. This is by no means a conclusive proof of the theory, but jointly with the doubt of the plausibility of coupons as mere price cuts, this is worthy of further investigation.
CONCLUSIONS
Our main goal in this paper was to summarize the various patterns of coupons. The results reported above imply that the relationship between shelf prices and coupons is complex and that monopoly price discrimination models are not as important as economists might expect. We considered evidence bearing on several additional explanations for coupons. The current results seem to suggest that strategic interactions between brands and between manufacturers are important to understanding coupons. We are less optimistic that explanations based on dynamic demand effects or the vertical relationship between cereal manufacturers and retailers will be applicable.
The number of coupons issued by all consumer goods manufacturers grew at over ten percent a year between 1980 and 1995. As our data demonstrate, cereal manufacturers contributed to this growth. Recently, however, a number of manufacturers have tried to curtail or completely stop couponing. In 1995, for instance, General Mills announced that it would no longer issue coupons but would instead commit to "every day low prices." The commitment did not last, however, and General Mills resumed issuing coupons. (Note that no other cereal manufacturers followed General Mills, at lest not initially.) In 1996, Procter & Gamble and nine other consumer products manufacturers stopped issuing coupons in three cities in upstate New York. Consumers met this announcement with revolt, staging boycotts of Procter & Gamble's products and convincing local politicians to take on the issue. The companies resumed couponing and eventually paid $4.2 million to settle charges that they had colluded to agree to stop issuing coupons.
The fact that manufacturers seem to dislike coupons lends credence to our finding that coupons are not profit-enhancing price discriminatory mechanisms. (Procter & Gamble's senior vice president for advertising and market research told the Wall Street Journal, "I don't like couponing. Period," Narisetti (1997) .) General Mill's claim that they would lower shelf prices when they stopped couponing appears inconsistent with our findings, but may be a public relations gesture more than a description of a new pricing policy. Clearly more work needs to be done to buttress our findings, but preliminary results suggest that coupons are not good examples of monopoly third-degree price discrimination.
There are many possible extensions to our work. Since our results seem to suggest that the simple textbook view of coupons as simple price discrimination tools does not capture the empirically most important dimensions of coupons, there is scope for more theoretical work on the effects of coupons. We tried to supply as much "stylized facts" as possible to motivate such work. Armed with additional theory one could reexamine our data with a structural model, which could measure the effects of various couponing strategies.
Percent National
The coupon data are organized by brand and, within brands, by the month on which the coupon was dropped. Within a brand-month, there are usually several keys (anywhere from zero to thirtyfive), distinguishing coupons dropped by different distributors, dropped on a different day within the month or distributed to different cities. For most keys, the exact cities to which the coupon was distributed are listed. For some keys, however, the data indicate simply that a coupon was targeted to a certain percent of the national market. For some of these percent national coupons, we can identify the exact cities they were targeting (e.g. because they are distributed to 100 percent of the national market). For most keys listing the percent national, however, we developed an algorithm for assigning them to specific cities. Specifically, if a percent national coupon was listed, we allocated it to all cities that were not individually cited on other keys issued by a given distributor on a given date. We calculated the probability that those cities received a coupon based on the target percent of the national market divided by the percent of the national market for which they accounted. In other words, if 40 percent of the cities received individual coupons and there was a coupon targeted at 20 percent of the national market, we assumed that the remaining 60 percent of the cities received a coupon with onethird probability.
We experimented with a number of different methods for allocating the percent national, and our results are insensitive to the specific algorithm we use. Also, we checked the coupons in our data set versus the coupons recorded in the free-standing inserts distributed through the local papers in Atlanta and Boston, and found a high level of accuracy. If anything, we attributed more coupons to the cities than were actually dropped, suggesting to us that the mean of COUPON DUMMY in Table 1 is too high. As a result of this attribute of our data, however, we are least confident in results that rely on cross-city comparisons.
Restrictions
In the results presented, we exclude all coupons for which the requirement involves purchasing another product, such as another cereal, or involves sending in proofs of purchase. We do this because assigning values to most of theses coupons is difficult (e.g. the coupon will guarantee to cover the cost of the purchase of a can of coffee, up to a certain limit). We also have information on PIM's estimates of the direct costs the manufacturer will incur redeeming the coupons. (The estimates are made by PIM using industry accepted redemption rates for certain types of coupons and distribution vehicles.) Based on those estimates, the coupons with restrictions that we exclude are not nearly as widely used as coupons without restrictions. Finally, results obtained including coupons involving restrictions are similar to the ones we present (unless otherwise noted).
Aggregation
Most studies of coupons use transaction level data and incorporate specific information about the buyer. We have opted to use data with richer cross-sectional and time series properties, though in order to do that we need to use data that aggregates over transactions along several dimensions. We performed several tests to evaluate the extent to which the aggregation is affecting our results.
AGGREGATION BY BOX SIZE:
The SHELF PRICE variable was created by dividing the dollar sales by the number of pounds sold. Cereal is sold in boxes of different sizes (generally between 10 and 20 ounces) and the price per pound varies by box size, tending to lower for larger boxes. If consumers systematically buy cereal in either larger or smaller boxes when coupons are available, the correlation we observe between prices and coupons will reflect this.
There are several reasons to believe that the patterns of box size sales would vary based on the availability of a coupon. For one, coupons may convince consumers to buy a brand that they otherwise would not have (so that their box-size choice will change the average box size) and some coupons only apply to bigger box sizes. We evaluated the extent to which such an effect is influencing our results by excluding coupons that imposed some size restriction on purchases. The results with the smaller subset of coupons were very similar to those presented in Table 2 . Coupons may also draw consumers who buy larger sizes into the market, if, for instance, consumers with larger households are more likely to change their buying behavior in response to a coupon promotion. It is also conceivable that coupons will induce people to buy smaller boxes since the deduction offered by the coupon represents a larger fraction of the price. In that case, the results in Table 2 would understate the negative correlation between coupons and shelf prices.
AGGREGATION OVER A QUARTER:
The pricing information we have also represents the average over a quarter. The negative correlation between prices and coupons we report in Table 5 would misstate the true relationship if sellers increased prices for a short time immediately after they issued a coupon and then lowered prices (below the level at which they set them in quarters without coupons) for the rest of the quarter. While somewhat contrived, this behavior would be consistent with the idea that sellers use coupons to price discriminate immediately following the coupon drop and then lower them to encourage coupon users to buy the product again. (This could be rational if consumers form product preferences over time -eventually the seller could raise the price.)
We evaluated the extent to which the aggregation by quarter is affecting our results by developing a variable to measure the number of coupons that were issued in a city for a particular brand during a quarter. We only considered coupons separate if they were issued more than seven days apart. When we included the number of coupons issued over the quarter along with the coupon dummy variable in specifications similar to those in Table 2 , the results suggest that a larger number of coupons are associated with lower average prices, suggesting that the negative correlation between prices and coupons is contemporaneous.
AGGREGATION ACROSS GROCERY STORES:
Our data also aggregate across grocery stores, though since all grocery stores accept coupons, each store faces the same incentive to change cereal prices in response to coupons. One could imagine that coupons might lead people to shop at more expensive stores, suggesting that the results in Table 2 understate the correlation between coupons and prices. It is hard to believe, however, that customers change their behavior in response to a coupon for one product. Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. They are robust to the presence of heteroskedasticity and adjust for correlation in the errors within a brand of cereal in a particular city. 
